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Abstract: The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the impact of corruption on foreign direct 
investment revenues in OIC countries. To do so, we have concentrated on a sample of 16 countries for 
which the necessary data were available for the period 2002-2008. We have used panel regression 
analysis. Our empirical results support that openness and Gross domestic product (GDP) have positive 
impact and inflation and corruption have negative impact on FDI in OIC countries.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Today, many countries due to inadequate domestic resources for investment, inclined to absorb foreign 
capital have found. On the other hand, foreign investors, especially multinational companies, to promote 
competitiveness and investment more profit to prone and advantageous regions. Also in the 
past two decades with promotion of technology, possibility of capital transmission has increased 
significantly. Natural result of the above factors is the growths of foreign capitalize in different countries, 
both developed and under development. Attract foreign direct investment to any country is not subject to 
the condition of entry liberalization and foreign investment incentives of financial donation to the foreign 
firm ,one of the important issues in strategies of attract foreign  investment is reducing risks of country. 
One of these risks is the host country political risks that the corruption is one of those risks. Unusual 
questions that are raised here is whether the corruption to attract FDI is good or bad? Especially, if 
corruption levels FDI, increased or decreased or not? 
  
The debate on the adverse effects of the level of corruption on FDI inflows has been analyzed in context of 
the costs of doing business. Since foreign investors have to pay extra costs in the form of bribes in order 
to get licenses or government permits to conduct investment, corruption raises the costs of investment. 
Such additional costs decrease the expected profitability of investment and so corruption is generally 
viewed as a tax on profits (Bardhan, 1997). Moreover, corruption increases uncertainty because 
corruption agreements are not enforceable in the courts of law. Foreign investors would tend to avoid 
investing in countries with high levels of corruption. Some studies have argued that corruption may have 
a positive effect on the economy: corruption, with reduction of paperwork, has attracted FDI so reduce 
once taxes and controls of non-rational capital. Houston (2007) studied the effects of corruption on a 
country’s economic performance and found that corruption has positive effects on economic growth in 
countries with a weak rule of law, while it has negative effects in countries with sound institutions. Also, 
Swaleheen and Stansel (2007) concluded that corruption enhances economic growth in countries with 
high economic freedom, while it hinders economic Growth in countries with low economic freedom. 
 
2. Review of Literature  
 
In this section, we review some major recent studies of relationship between corruption and FDI. 
However, the main conclusion of most studies supported the positive impact of CPI on tax revenue of 
developed as compared to developing countries. Abed and Davoodi (2000) use a cross-sectional as well as 
a panel data analysis to examine the effects of levels of corruption on per capita FDI inflows to transition 
economies. They found that countries with a low level of corruption attract more per capita FDI. Wei 
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(2000) studied the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment. The sample covers bilateral 
investment from twelve source countries to 45 host countries. There are two central findings. First, a rise 
in either the tax rate on multinational firms or the corruption level in a host country reduced inward 
foreign direct investment. In benchmark estimation, an increase in the corruption level from that of 
Singapore to that of Mexico would have the same negative effect on inward FDI as raising the tax rate by 
fifty percentage points. Second, American investors were averse to Corruption in host countries, but not 
necessarily more so than average OECD investors. This is a cross-sectional study relying on data for the 
year 1993. 
 
Akcay (2001) failed to find evidence of a negative relationship between FDI and corruption. He concluded 
that the most significant determinants of FDI are market size, corporate tax rates, labor costs, and 
openness. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) also supported the negative impact of corruption. Their analysis 
showed that foreign investors generally avoid corruption because it is considered wrong and can create 
operational inefficiencies. Smarzynska and Wei (2002) used a firm-level data set from transition 
economies to investigate the effects of corruption in terms of firms’ decision not to enter a particular 
market, rather than in terms of reduced bilateral investment flows. Larrain and Tavares (2004) estimated 
the impact of FDI inflows on corruption at the country level, taking into account the issue of reverse 
causation. They found that FDI as a share of GDP is significantly associated with lower corruption levels, 
irrespective of import intensity levels. The quantitative impact of FDI on corruption appears to be of the 
same order of magnitude as that of per capita GDP. Mathur (2007) found that corruption perception 
played a big role in investors’ decision of where to invest. 
  
Zhou (2007) concluded that the overall effect of corruption is significantly negative on the Probability of 
both FDI inflows and stocks being present, which indicates the dominant effect of non-discriminatory 
corruption in determining MNEs’ FDI decisions. His estimation results showed that the effects of 
corruption on the short term (measured by FDI inflows) and long-term (measured by FDI stocks) 
decisions are not exactly the same, therefore when studying the effect of corruption we need to specify 
whether it is the short-term or long-term investment choices we are interested in. Al-Sadig (2009) used a 
cross-sectional as well as a panel data analysis to examine the effects of levels of corruption on FDI for 
117 countries over the period 1984–2004, He found that corruption has a negative effect on FDI, for all 
countries. Kardesler (2009) find that corruption has a negative effect on FDI, contrary to the Efficient 
grease Hypothesis, in the case of the EU region. This finding implies that investors are not eager to make 
FDI in economies that experience high levels of corruption in the EU region. Kyung (2009) studied the 
effect of corruption on FDI and concluded that corruption is bad for economy. However, some data 
implied that the economic effects of corruption may depend on initial conditions, such as given level of 
corruption. In this paper he showed that, the effects of corruption on FDI are same in different groups of 
countries. The hypothesis is that while corruption decreases FDI level in highly corrupted countries, or 
developed countries; they have no correlation in low corrupted countries, or developing countries. 
 
3.  Model, data, and estimation methodology 
 
This article employs panel data for 16 countries over the period 2002-2008. All countries (OIC) for which 
data are available over this period are included in this study. In our study, we will use of panel data 
methods to estimate data. The FDI data is in terms of USA dollars and obtained from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI, 2009). Our independent variable include Openness of the economy 
(computed as export plus import as a share of GDP), GDP and Inflation come from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI, 2009). Comparison of these data in table (1) indicates that measure 
of average GDP, average Openness and FDI in OIC countries. The dependent variable is FDI inflows. The 
key explanatory variable is the corruption level in the host country as measured by the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index. Corruption is an index scaled from 6 (highly corrupt) to 0 
(highly clean). 
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4. Results 
 
Comparison of corruption and Average of some Variables in table (1) & (2) shows that Jordan, Turkey and 
Tunisia are cleaner than other selected countries. As can be seen some recent and potential members 
have relatively bad scores. As it shown in Table (2) & Fig (1) the average of Foreign Direct Investment and 
GDP in Turkey is more than the other countries. Turkey has a low corruption and high foreign direct 
investment and GDP among selected countries. 
 
Table 1: Corruption Index in Selected OIC Countries, 2008 
 
Rank Country Score 
85 Albania 3.4 
92 Algeria 3.2 
147 Bangladesh 2 
151 Cote 2.1 
115 Egypt 2.8 
141 Iran 2.3 
47 Jordan 5.1 
145 Kazakhstan 2.2 
80 Morocco 3.5 
121 Nigeria 2.2 
134 Pakistan 2.5 
85 Senegal 3.4 
80 Thailand 3.5 
62 Tunisia 4.4 
58 Turkey 4.6 
126 Uganda 2.6 
Source: Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2009 
 
Table 2: Average of Variables in Selected OIC countries (million dollars) 
 
                    Country 
Average Foreign Direct 
Investment  
Average GDP  
Albania 406 8,411 
Algeria 1,395 105,198 
Bangladesh 563 60,885 
Cote 309 16,806 
Egypt 5,518 105,728 
Iran 2,469 207,743 
Jordan 1,814 14,270 
Kazakhstan 6,284 67,864 
Morocco 1,777 62,351 
Nigeria 4,440 120,968 
Pakistan 2,854 113,956 
Senegal 211 8,977 
Thailand 7,400 190,568 
Tunisia 1,459 30,080 
Turkey 10,872 474,154 
Uganda 461 9,463 
    Source: www.sesrtcic.org 
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Fig.1. Average FDI in selected OIC countries 2002-2008 (million dollars) 
FDI
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In this section, we detail the main empirical studies that attempt to estimate the Importance of the 
different determinants of FDI flows with panel data. In general a regression model of panel data is as 
follow: 
 
 
Where E (Ut) and have constant variance.  include Fixed Effects that show difference between individual, 
households or countries especial characteristic. 
  
 
First we test heterogeneous between units by F-statistic. If null hypothesis is not accepted, we use panel 
data. Null hypothesis is: 
 
 
 
 
RRSS: Restrict Residual sum Squares 
URSS: Unrestricted Residual sum Squares 
N= numbers of units 
K= numbers of Parameters 
 
Then for choice between Fixed Effect (F.E) and Random Effect (R.E) models, we used Hausman Test: 
 
H= (bs-Bs) (M1-M0)-1 (bs-Bs).x2 (r) 
 
r = number of parameters.  
M1= covariance matrix for coefficients of F.E model (bs). 
M0= covariance matrix for coefficients of R.E model (bs). 
 
The basic model is estimated on panel data for 16 OIC countries and the sample period is 2002-2008. 
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The estimation results using Eviews 6 are shown in table (3). As seen from Table (3), GDP and Openness 
have positive effect, Corruption has a negative and significance impact, Inflation has negative and 
insignificance effect on FDI inflows. In Hausman test null hypothesis show fixed effect. In accordance to 
above tests we run the regression whit fixed effect model (EGLS method). Table 3 presents the Panel 
EGLS (cross-section weights) regression results. 
 
Table 3: Estimation of Model (2002-2008) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. error t-stat Prob. 
LOG(GDP) 1.169522 0.132914 8.799101 0 
INF -0.00877 0.009184 -0.954668 0.3422 
OPENNESS 0.02615 0.005597 4.672159 0 
CPI 0.469289 0.140047 3.35094 0.0012 
R-squared0                    .93     
F-statistic                   71.52     
Durbin-Watson stat  1.64     
                                                                                 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations   
 
In this study shows that the sign of corruption regressed on FDI is positive; it means that decreasing 
corruption (that is, CPI index increases) implies increasing FDI. We find that corruption perception does 
play a big role in investors’ decision of where to invest. The more corrupt a country is perceived to be, the 
less the flows of FDI to OIC country. There is positive and significant relationship between foreign direct 
investment and gross domestic product, trade openness and inflation has negative and insignificant 
impact on FDI. Also, the explanatory power of the model is high; that is, it can explain % 93 of factors 
determining foreign direct investment. Therefore, policies to eliminate corruption in these countries are 
suggested. Also, due to the fact that corruption is a multi-dimensional phenomenon then fighting against 
corruption is a very hard job. Therefore, the role of international corporations via International 
Organization such as The World Bank and Transparency International should be taken into account. 
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